Kicksecure - A Security Hardened Linux Distribution

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Kicksecure is a derivative of Debian. Freedom Software / Open Source.

About Kicksecure.

Hardening by Default

Kicksecure is a hardened operating system designed to be resistant to viruses and various attacks. It is based on Debian in accordance with an advanced multi-layer defense model, thereby providing in-depth security. Kicksecure provides protection from many types of malware in its default configuration with no customization required.

Table: Kicksecure Hardening Features

Feature Description
Default Package Selection No unnecessary software is installed by default such as exim, samba, cups that otherwise gets installed by some flavors of Debian. [1]

Torified operating system (apt) upgrades

Tor logo

This mitigates against targeted, malicious software upgrades.

  • Worst: Most iPhone / Android devices [2] are using official appstores are connected to the user's real identity and IP address. Therefore a huge risk for targeted attacks. [3]
  • Better: Linux distributions such as Debian do not connect the user's identity to update servers, however update over clearnet by default with their real IP address.
  • Best: Kicksecure updates all operating system upgrades over the Tor network by default. Update servers know neither the identity nor IP address of the user.
Secure Package Sources Configuration HTTPS (TLS) is enabled by default in APT. [4]
TCP ISN CPU
Information Leak Protection 		tirdadarchive.org iconarchive.today icon TCP Initial Sequence Numbers Randomization prevents TCP ISN-based CPU Information Leaks; see footnote. [5]
security-misc security-miscarchive.org iconarchive.today icon enhances miscellaneous security settings related to:
  • kernel hardening settings as recommended by the Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP)
  • protecting Linux user accounts against brute force attacks
  • enforcing Strong Linux User Account Isolation
  • disabling legacy login methods via Console Lockdown for improved security hardening
  • higher quality randomness (entropy) generation [6]
  • sysctl
  • boot parameters
  • various blacklisted kernel modules
  • network hardening
  • restrictive mount options
  • root access restrictions
  • access rights restrictions
  • application-specific hardening
Secure network time synchronization using sdwdate Secure Distributed Web Date (sdwdate) mitigates threats from time based attacks by not relying upon unauthenticated NTP.
Default security software
installations 		Software like AppArmor and Hardened Malloc (Light)
Open Link Confirmationarchive.org iconarchive.today icon This is enabled by default and prevents links from being unintentionally opened in supported browsers.

Planned Features

The Kicksecure development roadmap includes various security improvements:

Usability by Default

Kicksecure aims to maximize usability by default so it can be utilized as an everyday, multipurpose operating system by users of all skill levels.

Table: Kicksecure Usability Features

Feature Description
Debian Usability Fixes
  • Functional default APT sources configuration. [10]
  • sudo pre-configured by default. [11]
  • bash-completion installed by default so for example by typing sudo apt install libreo followed by the TAB key a word completion to libreoffice will be suggested.
  • zsh installed as default shell that supports TAB word completion, colorful output, etc.
Simplicity and flexibility
  • Package shared folder helparchive.org iconarchive.today icon simplifies shared folder set up for virtual machines. [12]
  • Package usabilty-miscarchive.org iconarchive.today icon is installed by default, increasing flexibility and providing numerous, miscellaneous usability features. [13]
Popular applications Popular applications come pre-installed and configured with safe defaults to make them ready for use right out of the box.
Data protection Sensitive user data is protected by state-of-the-art cryptographic tools:

Design and Development Vision

Introduction

While many valuable security guides exist, better security and privacy for the masses necessitates software that applies a majority of hardening instructions by default.

This is the reason the Free and Open Source Kicksecure project exist; to offer a system that provides a reasonable security-hardened baseline, with the in-built flexibility to apply additional hardening dependent upon the user's threat model, hardware capabilities, motivation and knowledge. [14] The table below provides a further rationale for this position.

Table: Security Guide Limitations

Factor Description
Initial vulnerability When a base system is first installed, various security customizations are not yet applied. All users are vulnerable during this period.
Recipient insecurity Security principles do not exist in a vacuum:
  • Even after applying various security hardening steps, correspondence/network partners might have serious, unaddressed vulnerabilities.
  • Some security problems cannot be solved by individuals and may rely on factors in the broader ecosystem. For example:
    • Advanced adversaries perform continual surveillance of all Internet traffic and attempt to attribute collected meta-data to individuals.
    • Following a guide to enhance entropy is insufficient if Tor relays being used are insecure.
    • Often personal security can only be improved if the security of others is also improved.
Reliance on human memory Adequate hardening often depends on discovering and remembering to apply all necessary steps from favorite security guides.
Error risks Manually applying security guide steps can lead to mistakes that render the whole procedure ineffective.
Time requirements Security guide steps are often lengthy and cover many different facets of computing.
Secure guide discovery There are countless security/hardening guides available on the Internet. It is impossible to follow them all and serious research is required to find valuable new resources.
Incompleteness Logically there is not one definitive, all-encompassing security guide. This means some users harden the kernel and install CPU microcode updates, while others rely on sandboxing and implement better random number generators, and so on. Most users miss critical elements because they are simply not aware they exist.
Currency Even the best security guides often contain outdated material. This is especially true for technically detailed or lengthy guides that canvass many topics.
Publication form The form of security guides can effect their utility. For example, those published in blogs and which do not allow comments have grave disadvantages compared to systems relying on collaborative version control software (like git) or collaborative websites (such as a wiki). The reason is contributors can easily fix issues or update contents.
Popularity Security guides which have low popularity cannot effect change and improve security practices if most people are unaware they exist.

For these reasons Kicksecure will remain focused on enabling the majority of (reasonable) hardening settings by default, and allowing additional settings to be easily enforced via installable packages. For further information on this topic, see: The Problem with Security Guides and How We Can Fix Itarchive.org iconarchive.today icon.

ISO

Planned. Not available yet. In development. There is no ETA (estimated time of arrival) yet. Check back later.

Are you a developer? Please contribute to the Kicksecure Freedom Software project to make the ISO available faster.

Kicksecure Development Goals

Kicksecure is a security-hardened Linux Distribution. (Mobile version not planned yet.)

This section details potential future security enhancements for Kicksecure.

(The wiki source for the following text can be found here.)

Most iPhone / Android devices [2] "Libre Android" [15] Linux Desktop Distributions Kicksecure Development Goals
Upgrades do not require vendor No Yes Yes Yes
User freedom to replace operating system No Yes Yes Yes
Administrator capabilities (root) not refused No Yes Yes Yes
Custom operating system (bootloader unlock) not refused No Yes Yes Yes
No trouble or void device warranty from software changes (rooting or bootloader unlock) No [16] No [17] Yes Yes
No user freedom restrictions No [18] Yes Yes Yes
No backdoors included No [19] Yes Yes Yes
No spyware included in operating system No [20] Yes Yes Yes
No culture of freemium applications that spy on users in appstores No [21] Yes Yes Yes
Culture of Freedom Software in appstores No Yes Yes Yes
Freedom Software No [22] Yes Yes Yes
Compromised application cannot access data of other applications Yes [23] Yes [23] No Yes
Malware on a compromised system cannot easily gain root Yes [24] Yes [24] No [25] Yes
Reasonable resistance against system wide rootkit Yes [26] Yes [26] No Yes
Verified Boot Yes Yes No Yes
Hardened Kernelarchive.org iconarchive.today icon Yes Yes some Yes
Full System MAC Policyarchive.org iconarchive.today icon Yes Yes No Yes
Internal storage can reasonably easily be removed and mounted elsewhere for the purpose of data recovery or hunting malware / rootkits. No [27] No [17] Yes [28] Yes [29]
Internal storage can reasonably easily be decrypted once transferred to a different device if password is known. No [30] No [31] Yes Yes [32]
Can reasonably easily boot from external hard drive, ignoring internal harddrive for purpose of data recovery or hunting malware / rootkits. No No [17] Yes Yes [29]
Can reasonably easily create full data backup. No [33] Yes Yes Yes [29]
Can reasonably easily create full data backup of any app when device is rooted with Titanium Backup or similar No [34] Yes Yes Yes [29]
Applications cannot refuse data backup (for purpose of malware, spyware analysis or backup and restore). No [35] Yes Yes [36] Yes [29]
No culture of users can ask device (code) for permission and device (code) will decide to grant or refuse the request. No Yes Yes [36] Yes [29]
No culture of applications refusing to run if device is rooted. No [37] Yes Yes Yes [29]
No culture of applications refusing to run if using a custom operating system (custom ROM). No [38] Yes Yes Yes [29]
User (privacy) settings are respected. No [39] Yes Yes Yes [29]
WiFi off indicator means that WiFi is really off. No [40] Yes Yes Yes [29]
Bluetooth off indicator means that Bluetooth is really off. No [41] Yes Yes Yes [29]
Prevention of targeted malicious upgrades. [42] No [3] ? [43] ? [44] Yes [45]
Vendors do not sometimes introduce mitigations that introduce attack surface. No [46] Yes Yes Yes [29]
The GNU Project does not state: "Apple's Operating Systems Are Malwarearchive.org iconarchive.today icon" and "Google's Software is Malwarearchive.org iconarchive.today icon". No Yes Yes Yes [29]

Quote More than a billion hopelessly vulnerable Android gizmos in the wild that no longer receive security updates – researcharchive.org iconarchive.today icon. The operating system of these devices:

  • Do not receive security upgrades from the vendor.
  • Third parties (such as users or the modding community) cannot provide (security) upgrades either due to locked bootloaders, which cannot be unlocked due to vendor decision and due to unavailability of a security bug which could unlock the bootloader.
  • Even if bootloaders can be unlocked there might not be an adequate operating system upgrades available from third parties, such as the modding community. Either due to unpopularity of the devices among modding developers and/or due to technical challenges.

Ability to upgrade (security fixes) devices; replace operating system; bootloader freedom vs bootloader non-freedom:

  • iPhones and some Android devices have locked boot loaders that cannot be unlocked. This restricts user freedom and makes replacing the operating system impossible without a verified boot bypass exploit. In case the vendor deprecated security support for the device, the only choices users realistically have is to keep using an insecure device, or to buy a device which still has security support. Similarly, locked bootloaders also prevent gaining administrator (root) access.
  • Some Android devices do allow unlocking the bootloader but not with custom verified boot keys, causing a decrease in security.
  • Some Android devices (such as the Nexus or Pixel devices) support full verified boot with custom keys that can be used with alternative operating systems.

In conclusion, when using iPhone/Android devices that still receive security updates, the iPhone/Android approach provides strong protection against malware, meaning those platforms are impacted much less than Windows or Linux desktops. [23] Despite the many downsides (Mobile Devices Backdoors in Most Phones Tablets Etc, Data Harvesting by Most Phones, ...), the security model of popular mobile operating systems often affords better protection when attempting to prevent any malicious and unapproved party from establishing a foothold in their ecosystem. In the process, the user's and the security community's ability to audit and control what their devices are actually doing is severely diminished. Due to a Conflict of Interest this comes at the expense of transferring power from the user to the developers, user freedom restrictions, Tyrant Security, War on General Purpose Computing.

Kicksecure will not implement these kinds of user freedom restrictions since it is not required nor desirable. The capability to replace the operating system or gain administrator access will remain fully supported. Many popular device operating systems utilize security technologies which restrict user freedoms. In contrast, Kicksecure aims to utilize the same security concepts for the goal of empowering the user and increasing protection from malware.

It is theoretically possible to provide some of the same iPhone / Android security concepts on the Linux Desktop too. Steps have already been made to apply mobile device security concepts to desktop Linux such as security-miscarchive.org iconarchive.today icon and apparmor-profile-everythingarchive.org iconarchive.today icon. Security technologies like hardened kernels or verified boot used by popular mobile operating systems could also be ported to Linux desktops. Community contributions are gladly welcomed! Here is a list of potential security enhancements for Kicksecure:

User Population / Promotion

  • Apply as many security settings by default without breaking usability too much.
  • Kicksecure is already the base for Whonix - Anonymous Operating System.

https://www.wilderssecurity.com/threads/hardened-debian-in-development-feedback-wanted.408245/archive.org iconarchive.today icon

Help Wanted

  • Does anyone want to help create an installer ISO?
  • Kicksecure will hopefully soon become available as a Template for Qubes OSarchive.org iconarchive.today icon.

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Debian bookworm Xfce live ISO installed exim, samba, cups by default.
  2. ↑ Jump up to: 2.0 2.1 Most iPhone / Android phones that are sold by mobile carriers or manufacturers have locked bootloaders. These phones are often packaged with spyware installed by default, which cannot be removed. There may be rare exceptions to this rule, hence "most" and not "all". These exceptions are not the point which shall be made in this comparison. See the "Libre Android" column for what is theoretically possible.
  3. ↑ Jump up to: 3.0 3.1 Vulnerability to Target Malicious Upgrades
  4. ↑ Debian installed using a Debian bookworm Xfce live ISO calamares came with an /etc/apt/sources.list file using http:// (unencrypted) instead of the more secure https:// (TLS) by default.
  5. ↑

    The Linux kernel has a side-channel information leak bug. It is leaked in any outgoing traffic. This can allow side-channel attacks because sensitive information about a system's CPU activity is leaked. It may prove very dangerous for long-running cryptographic operations. Research has demonstrated that it can be used for de-anonymization of location-hidden services.
  6. ↑ Better encryption is achieved via preinstalled random number generators, specifically:
    • Loading of the jitterentropy-rng kernel module by default.
    • Installation of the user space entropy gathering daemons haveged and jitterentropy-rng by default.
    • See also: Dev/Entropy.
  7. ↑ This is a security-focused general purpose memory allocator providing the malloc API along with various extensions. It provides substantial hardening against heap corruption vulnerabilities.
  8. ↑ use DNSCrypt by defaultarchive.org iconarchive.today icon
  9. ↑ DNS spoofing results in traffic being diverted to the attacker's computer (or any other computer).
  10. ↑ Debian comes with a broken /etc/apt/sources.list file by default.
    • Debian default /etc/apt/sources.list comes with a broken deb cd-rom: line.
    • Debian default /etc/apt/sources.list comes with http instead of https by default.
    • Debian default /etc/apt/sources.list has only the debian-security repository enabled by default but not the debian repository. As a result, no packages are installable until the user figures out how to add that line to APT sources.
  11. ↑ On Debian, the user must run after a new installation su followed by /usr/bin/adduser user sudo and reboot (or re-login) to be able to user sudo.
  12. ↑ It currently only assists with using shared folders in VirtualBox. Other virtualizers -- such as KVM shared folder setup -- might be possible in the future.
  13. ↑ Such as creating default folders, allowing commands to be run without a password, simplifying the running of OpenVPN as an unpriveleged user, and much more.
  14. ↑ It is also accepted that no "perfect configuration" exists that can make a system invulnerable against advanced adversaries. Further, systems that are excessively hardened can become almost unusable except for the most advanced individuals.
  15. ↑ There is no "Libre Android" at time of writing. It's only a concept to illustrate a point. There is no "perfect" Android distribution. GrapheneOS has verified boot but root access is refused in default buildsarchive.today icon. Replicant allows root access, but no references were found that Replicant makes use of verified boot yet. It's not relevant to pick any specific Android distribution for the sake of making the point "iPhone and Android Level Security for Linux Desktop Distributions" no specific Android distribution was chosen for this compassion. A "perfect" Android distribution checking all "green yes" is possible in theory. It doesn't exist due to policy decisions. (GrapheneOS vs root in default builds vs device selection / features.) There are no technical reasons for non-existence. See also this Overview of Mobile Projects, that focus on either/and/or security, privacy, anonymity, source-available, Freedom Software..
  16. ↑ https://www.howtogeek.com/240417/does-rooting-or-unlocking-void-your-android-phones-warranty/archive.org iconarchive.today icon
  17. ↑ Jump up to: 17.0 17.1 17.2 Same issue as Most iPhone / Android devices since inheriting the same hardware limitations.
  18. ↑ Mobile Devices Restrictions
  19. ↑ Mobile Devices Backdoors in Most Phones Tablets Etc
  20. ↑ Data Harvesting by Most Phones
  21. ↑ Data Harvesting by Most Apps
  22. ↑ Comes with a lot proprietary software installed by default.
  23. ↑ Jump up to: 23.0 23.1 23.2 That would require an exploit. In comparison, a compromised application on the Linux desktop running under user has full access to all information which that user has access to, including all files, keystrokes and so on. The exception is when mandatory access control (MAC)archive.org iconarchive.today icon is in use and successfully confines that application.
  24. ↑ Jump up to: 24.0 24.1 Occasionally there are exploits that allow applications to gain root, but as time passes more of these vulnerabilities are being fixed.
  25. ↑ On the Linux desktop the process of Preventing malware from Sniffing the Root Password is cumbersome and unpopular. Therefore any compromised application on the Linux desktop could lead to root compromise. This in turn might compromise the bootloader, kernel, or even hardware. It is difficult to detect malware, remove a rootkitarchive.org iconarchive.today icon and indicators of compromise are rare.
  26. ↑ Jump up to: 26.0 26.1 Through verified boot.
  27. ↑
  28. ↑ Computer (non-mobile) hardware is much more flexible. Storage devices can be removed from a computer, then added to another computer as a secondary disk. When booting from an installation assumed to be uncompromised (by [the same] malware), a search for malware can be performed on the other disk without executing any code, reducing risk of infection for the booted disk. This kind of procedure can be performed reasonably easily by most repair shops, and even non-technical people can do this without the need for soldering.
  29. ↑ Jump up to: 29.00 29.01 29.02 29.03 29.04 29.05 29.06 29.07 29.08 29.09 29.10 29.11 29.12 Same as Linux Desktop Distributions.
  30. ↑ Limitations on Encryption Key Backups
  31. ↑ Same issue as Most iPhone / Android devices. Limitation of hardware, not software.
  32. ↑ Same as Linux Desktop Distributions.
  33. ↑ See next point below.
  34. ↑ Signal messenger apparchive.org iconarchive.today icon is such an example. People expected Titanium Backuparchive.org iconarchive.today icon to be able to backup the Signal app data but lost dataarchive.org iconarchive.today icon. Extra steps are required for a Signal backup.archive.org iconarchive.today icon (Instructions untested by author of this wiki page.)
  35. ↑ Quote https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/application-element#allowbackuparchive.org iconarchive.today icon android:allowBackup

    Whether to allow the application to participate in the backup and restore infrastructure. If this attribute is set to false, no backup or restore of the application will ever be performed, even by a full-system backup that would otherwise cause all application data to be saved via adb. The default value of this attribute is true.

  36. ↑ Jump up to: 36.0 36.1 If credentials can be provided (full disk encryption password if used), (super) root will have full access.
  37. ↑ How to prevent applications from discovering my phone as being Rootedarchive.org iconarchive.today icon
  38. ↑ How-To Geek: SafetyNet Explained: Why Android Pay and Other Apps Don’t Work on Rooted Devicesarchive.org iconarchive.today icon
  39. ↑ AP Exclusive: Google tracks your movements, like it or notarchive.org iconarchive.today icon

    Google wants to know where you go so badly that it records your movements even when you explicitly tell it not to.

    An Associated Press investigation found that many Google services on Android devices and iPhones store your location data even if you’ve used a privacy setting that says it will prevent Google from doing so.

    Computer-science researchers at Princeton confirmed these findings at the AP’s request.
  40. ↑

    How it works, according to Google, is that the Android Location Services periodically checks on your location using GPS, Cell-ID, and Wi-Fi to locate your device. When it does this, your Android phone will send back publicly broadcast Wi-Fi access points' Service set identifier (SSID) and Media Access Control (MAC) data. Again, this isn't just how Google does it; it's how everyone does it. It's Industry practice for location database vendors.
  41. ↑ Google can still use Bluetooth to track your Android phone when Bluetooth is turned offarchive.org iconarchive.today icon
  42. ↑ As in singling out specific users. Shipping malicious upgrades to select users only.
  43. ↑ Probably same as Linux Desktop Distributions.
  44. ↑ Linux distributions usually do not require an e-mail based login to receive upgrades. Users can still be singled out by IP addresses unless users opt-in for using something such as apt-transport-tor which is not the default.
  45. ↑ All upgrades are downloaded over Tor. There is no way for the server to ship legit upgrade packages to most users while singling out specific users for targeted attacks.
  46. ↑ Some Android vendors introduce mitigations that introduce attack surfacearchive.org iconarchive.today icon.
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